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We analyze the link between economic conditions and the quality of suicide terrorism. While the existing
empirical literature shows that poverty and economic conditions are not correlated with the quantity
of terror, theory predicts that poverty and poor economic conditions may affect the quality of terror.
Poor economic conditions may lead more able, better-educated individuals to participate in terror attacks,
allowing terror organizations to send better-qualified terrorists to more complex, higher-impact, terror
missions. Using the universe of Palestinian suicide terrorists against Israeli targets between the years
2000 and 2006 we provide evidence on the correlation between economic conditions, the characteristics
of suicide terrorists and the targets they attack. High levels of unemployment enable terror organizations
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Do poor economic conditions affect terrorism? A growing body of empirical literature shows 
that poverty and economic conditions are not directly correlated with the occurrence of terrorism 
(Abadie, 2006; Drakos and Gofas, 2006a; Krueger and Malechova 2003; Krueger and Laitin, 2008; 
Piazza,  2006).  The  lack  of  correlation  between  the  frequency  of  terror  attacks  and  economic 
conditions, combined with the privileged background of suicide terrorist found in earlier studies, 
suggests that economic conditions do not have a direct and straightforward effect on terrorism. 
However,  economic  conditions  may  affect  terrorism  through  other,  indirect,  channels.  While 
economic  conditions  are  probably  not  root  causes  of  terrorism,  and  do  not  affect  the  level  of 
terrorism, they could still impact the nature and type of terror attacks. 
This paper adds to the debate on the relation between economic conditions and terrorism by 
studying the intensive rather than the extensive margin of terrorism. Whereas the related empirical 
literature has focused on the quantity or the amount of terror, we study the quality of terrorism and 
its relation to underlying economic conditions. The notion that economic conditions are potentially 
correlated  with  the  quality  of  terrorism  has  been  suggested  by  Bueno  de  Mesquita  (2005a).  
According  to  his  theoretical  analysis,  individuals  have  to  choose  whether  to  work  in  a  market 
economy or volunteer to carry terror attacks. Rational individuals become terrorists only if their 
utility of carrying a terror attack is higher than their utility of working in the market economy. When 
economic conditions are good, and unemployment is low, there are desirable opportunities for able 
individuals that choose to join the market economy. Therefore, only individuals with low ability, 
those  unable  to  find  a  job  even  under  good  market  conditions,  are  the  ones  who  join  terror 
organizations. When market conditions deteriorate, the economic opportunities of able individuals 
deteriorate as well. Worsening economic conditions should ease the recruiting of more able and  
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better-educated individuals by terror organizations, even if the launching of a terror campaign and 
the quantity of terrorism are driven by strategic decisions taken by terror organizations irrespective 
of economic conditions. In other words, economic conditions should affect the supply of individuals 
willing to join terror organizations.
1 By screening volunteers and selecting only the most competent 
to  commit  attacks,  terror  organizations  may  be  able  to  send  more  capable  terrorists  under 
recessionary economic conditions. That is, we should observe that economic conditions affect the 
quality (rather than the quantity) of terrorism.
2  
This  paper  provides  a  systematic  analysis  of  the  link  between  economic  conditions,  the 
quality of suicide terrorists, the characteristics of their targets, and the outcomes of their attacks. We 
combine  a  detailed  data  set  on  the  universe  of  Palestinian  suicide  terrorists  during  the  second 
Intifada with data on earnings and labor force participation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and 
with data on Israeli counterterrorism measures. Our results suggest that there is strong correlation 
between economic conditions and the characteristics of suicide terrorists and targets they attack. 
Higher  unemployment  enables  terror  organizations  to  recruit  more  educated,  mature  and 
experienced suicide terrorists, who in turn attack more important targets, located closer to their 
district of residence. Furthermore, we show that bad economic conditions do not drive the quality of 
                                                 
1 This does not necessarily imply that individuals choose to become suicide terrorists the same way they 
choose, for example, between enrolling on higher education or joining the labor market. Simply put, 
unemployed individuals spend more time socializing with their peers in places, like mosques, where 
“enlistment  officers”  are  more  likely  to  recruit  them.  See  Pape  (2005)  and  Pedahzur  (2005)  for 
descriptions of recruiting for suicide missions by Palestinian factions. 
2 Becker and Posner (2005) apply similar intuition in a rational model of suicide. In their application to 
suicide bombers, they also highlight the impact of market opportunities on the individuals’ decision to 
go  on  a  suicide  mission.  Unlike  Bueno  de  Mesquita  (2005a),  Becker  and  Posner  (2005)  study 
exclusively  individuals’  decision  making  and  do  not  incorporate  into  the  analysis  the  strategic 
considerations of terror organizations.   
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terror equally for different organizations. In the spirit of the club model proposed by Berman and 
Laitin (2008), groups that provide excludable public goods increase their ability to commit terror 
attacks during difficult economic times.   
These results have important implications for the design of efficient policies of counter-
terrorism.  The  most  common  policies  of  counterterrorism  are  aimed  to  incapacitate  terror 
organizations by cracking down on their members and by enacting security measures that affect the 
probability of success of a planned attack. The connection between economic conditions and the 
quality of terrorism suggests that policies intended to improve economic development and stimulate 
economic growth might reduce the quality, and thus the threat, of suicide terrorism. The suggested 
policy implications have, however, one important caveat. Institutions that provide economic aid 
geared to stimulate economic sustainability need to pay particular attention to the ideology and 
political  objectives  of  the  local  organizations  administering  their  aid.  Even  if  these  local 
organizations use the donors’ aid to provide important public goods (like education and health), our 
analysis  shows  that  this  aid  may  allow  terror  organizations  to  coerce  the  local  population  into 
increasing violence and terrorism.  
 
2. Data 
A.  Data on Palestinian Suicide Terrorists 
The data on Palestinian suicide terrorists is an updated version of the data set constructed by 
Benmelech and Berrebi (2007) from reports of the Israeli Security Agency (ISA). The data details 
the biographies of all Palestinian suicide terrorists that attacked (or attempted to attack) targets in 
Israel,  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip  between  September  2000  and  December  2006.  The  data 
contains detailed information on terrorists’ characteristics, targets’ characteristics and outcome of 
the attacks.  
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Our data set includes 157 suicide terrorists for whom we know their names, membership in 
terror organization, age, city of residence, whether they had an academic degree or attended an 
institution of higher education, and whether they were previously on ISA’s most wanted terrorists 
list, were incarcerated, or were detained by the Israeli security forces.  
Figure 1 displays the number of suicide terrorists coming from each of the ten districts in the 
West Bank, from the five districts in the Gaza Strip, and from Jerusalem. The figure exhibits a high 
geographic variation with respect to district of origin of suicide terrorists, especially among districts 
in the West Bank. For example, whereas 45 percent of suicide terrorists resided in Nablus and Jenin, 
only two suicide terrorists resided in the neighboring districts Salfit, Tubas and Jericho.  
Table 1 reports detailed summary statistics on suicide terrorists and targets’ characteristics. 
The top panel of Table 1 focuses on the characteristics of suicide terrorists. Panel A shows that 31 
terrorists were enrolled at the time of the attack in an institution of higher education or completed 
academic studies by that time. This rate is higher than the equivalent rate for the entire Palestinian 
population of 8 percent (Berrebi, 2007), and confirms findings regarding the relative privileged 
background  of  terrorists  elsewhere  (Krueger,  2007  and  2008;  Krueger  and  Maleckova,  2003; 
Sageman, 2004). The youngest suicide terrorist is 12 years old, the oldest is 64 years old and their 
average age is slightly over 21 years old. Out of the 157 suicide terrorists during this time period, 19 
(12.1%) had prior known terrorist activity experience: they were either previously detained in Israeli 
prisons or accused of being involved in terror activity by the ISA before their attacks. 
Panel  B  of  the  table  focuses  on  two  variables  that  measure  target  importance.  The  first 
measure  is  a  dummy  variable  that  equals  one  for  localities  with  a  population  of  over  50,000  
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residents and zero otherwise.
3 The second measure of target importance is a dummy variable for 
localities that host an official bureau of the Ministry of Interior, thus effectively acting as regional 
capitals.
4  Arguably,  the  two  variables  are  sensible  proxies  for  the  importance  of  the  targeted 
localities. Table 1 shows that suicide terrorists tend to attack these types of localities. Big cities were 
targeted in almost 75 percent of the attacks, even though less than 10 percent of Israeli cities have 
over  50,000  inhabitants.  Similarly,  over  50  percent  of  the  attacks  (i.e.,  84  attacks)  occurred  in 
regional  capitals  even  though  less  than  15  percent  of  the  localities  act  in  that  capacity.  These 
findings are consistent with previous results showing that city population and regional capitals are 
strongly  and  positively  correlated  with  the  frequency  of  terror  attacks  in  Israel  (Berrebi  and 
Lakdawalla, 2007). 
  The third panel of Table 1 presents two variables that proxy for the logistics behind suicide 
attacks. To construct these variables we use Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to measure i) 
the distance between the suicide terrorist’s locality of residence and his or her target, and ii) the 
distance between the headquarter of the faction dispatching the terrorist and the attack’s target. 
There is a high degree of variability in both variables. On average, terrorists travel 26.6 km to their 
targets, where the maximum distance traveled is 142.4 km. Likewise, the mean distance between the 
head quarters of the terror cell that dispatches the suicide terrorist and the target is 25.9 km. The 
large distances traveled by suicide terrorists, considering Israel’s modest size, suggest that terror 
                                                 
3  The  localities’  size  refers  to  their  population  within  the  metro  area  of  the  city  according  to  the 
population figures for the year 2003 of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. Our analysis is robust to 
alternative cutoffs such as 100,000 or 150,000 residents.  
4 An official bureau of the Ministry of Interior includes the following: National Election Inspection 
Bureau, Regional Appeal Committee, Regional Licensing and Supervising Bureau, and Regional or Sub-
Regional Population Administration Bureau.  
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organizations  select  their  targets  carefully,  with  geographic  proximity  being  only  one  of  many 
relevant factors affecting their decision. 
Finally, the bottom panel of Table 1 presents summary statistics on the outcome of the 
attacks. The first row of Panel D provides information on caught suicide terrorists. We classify 
suicide terrorists as “caught” if they failed to detonate their explosive devices, were apprehended or 
killed before they managed to detonate their explosives, blew themselves up before they reached 
their desired target, or left without completing the attack (i.e. “chickened out”). Our sample contains 
39 suicide terrorists that are classified as caught, 27 of which were killed or died during capture. We 
also report summary statistics on casualties caused by the attacks (that is, counts of individuals 
killed or wounded in the aftermath of the suicide attacks). On average, a suicide attack caused 
almost 30 casualties, but there are several failed attacks that did not cause any casualty and there are 
others that caused over 150 casualties. Most of the attacks caused at least 10 casualties. 
Our analysis below differentiates between suicide terrorists of high and low quality. We 
define a suicide terrorist as of high quality based on information on his or her education, past 
involvement in terror activity, and age. Our data include 31 terrorists with academic education, 19 
terrorists that were previously involved in terror activities, and 81 terrorists who were older than 20 
at the time of the attack (63 are below that age).
5 The three characteristics of suicide terrorists show 
similar correlations with other variables in Table 1. Suicide terrorists of high quality are associated 
with  more  complex  terror  attacks,  more  important  targets,  and  better  outcomes  for  the  terror 
organizations (Benmelech and Berrebi, 2007). The only notable difference among our three proxies 
for  the  terrorists’  quality  is  that,  unlike  more  educated  and  mature  terrorists,  suicide  terrorists 
                                                 
5 The results below are robust to any other sensible age cutoff.  We choose the cutoff “older than 20 
years old” because the median and average terrorists are 21 years old, and there are 13 terrorists that are 
exactly at this age.  
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previously detained in Israeli prisons or accused of being involved in terror activity by the ISA 
travel shorter distances to commit an attack. These terrorists attack targets closer to the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip because they face a higher risk of being apprehended by the Israeli security forces if 
they travel deeper into Israeli territory. Nevertheless, experienced terrorists are still more likely to 
attack regional capitals and populated localities. 
 
B.  Data on Economic and Demographic Indicators of West Bank and Gaza Strip 
The data on economic and demographic variables come from the Palestinian Labor Force 
Survey (PLFS) of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Administered by the Palestinian Central Bureau of 
Statistics  (PCBS),  the  survey  covers  a  representative  sample  of  the  Palestinian  population.  The 
survey has been conducted every quarter since 1995 and provides information every quarter on 
about 22,000 individuals aged 15 and above residing in East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip. Since our empirical analysis focuses on the second Intifada, we use data from all quarterly 
surveys between the years 2000 and 2006, with a total of over 620 thousands observations. We use 
these micro-level data to calculate economic and demographic variables at the district level. 
We start by collecting information on every individual in the PLFS micro-dataset. We collect 
information on the individuals’ district of residence, age, marital status, gender, years of education, 
workplace location (Israel or Palestinian territories), and type of locality of residence (city, village 
or  refugee  camp).  The  PLFS  also  provides  information  on  the  individuals’  labor  force  status 
(employer, self-employed, salaried worker, unemployed, or out of the labor force). While the PLFS 
does  not  report  the  actual  individuals’  income,  it  groups  those  individuals  that  earned  strictly 
positive incomes into four bins of roughly the same size according to their earnings, and reports the 
income group to which they were assigned.    
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We next move to use the micro-level data to calculate district-level economic conditions. We 
collapse the micro-level data by year, quarter, and district. Using the weights provided by the PLFS, 
we compute, for each of these cells, weighted averages of our economic and demographic variables. 
Several observations are in order regarding the construction of these variables. First, the definition 
of the local unemployment rate, the main treatment of interest, includes not only individuals actively 
looking  for  work  but  also  individuals  out  of  the  labor  force,  a  more  appropriate  measure  of 
underlying economic conditions.
6 Second, we use, as an alternative treatment, the same definition of 
unemployment but restricted to the male population between the ages of 15 and 35 years old. Given 
that 139 out of a sample of 157 suicide terrorists belong to this demographic group, this is arguably 
a more relevant variable than the overall level of unemployment.
7   
Finally, we also examine the impact of income inequality on the quality of suicide terrorists. 
This variable is used to test the hypothesis that suicide terrorists are mainly motivated by altruistic 
concerns  (Azam,  2005).  Pape  (2005,  p.  172),  for  example,  argues  that  “high  levels  of  social 
integration and respect for community values cause otherwise normal individuals to commit suicide 
out of a sense of duty.” Accordingly, given that social integration and in-group identification are 
inversely related to income inequality (Shayo, 2009), the theory of “altruistic suicide terrorism” 
predicts a negative correlation between income inequality and the quality of suicide terrorism.
8 
                                                 
6 Our results are qualitatively the same when we use the standard definition of unemployment.   
7 We thus apply to our study of terrorism the recommendations of Gould et al. (2002) with respect to 
crime. Gould et al. (2002) show that the labor market conditions for young unskilled men (rather than 
the general unemployment rate) is correlated with the crime rate, because crime is perpetrated mainly by 
this subpopulation of individuals.  
8 As already stated, the PLFS does not provide information on individuals’ actual earnings. Therefore, 
we compute a relative measure of income inequality by adding to the four groups of individuals with 




Table 2 displays summary statistics of the economic and demographic variables of interest 
for all districts during the entire period at issue.   
As  a  first  cut,  the  table  provides  a  general  overview  of  Palestinian  economic  and 
demographic  conditions  during  the  period  of  the  second  Intifada.  While  we  observe  a  high 
unemployment rate, both for the general and the group-specific populations, we must keep in mind 
that we use a broad definition of unemployment that includes individuals not actively looking for 
work. Therefore, while representing the prevailing economic conditions more accurately, these rates 
are significantly higher than the official unemployment rates published by the PCBS. The table also 
shows relatively low average years of schooling for the entire period. The table masks, however, a 
significant increase of average schooling from 8.8 years in 2000 to 9.6 years in 2006.  
 
C.  Data on Curfews and Palestinian Fatalities 
Our analysis includes data on Israeli security measures and districts’ level of violence.  The 
available  measures  are  the  number  of  Israeli-induced  Palestinian  fatalities,  and  the  number  of 
curfews days per district-quarter cell. The data on Palestinian fatalities during the second Palestinian 
uprising come from B’tselem, an Israeli human rights organization. B’tselem’s data (considered 
accurate, reliable and comprehensive) are widely used in studies focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict (see, for example, Jaeger et al., 2008 and Gould and Klor, 2010). The data on curfews was 
obtained from the United Nation’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 
This  organization  coordinates  humanitarian  action  on  behalf  of  the  United  Nations  in  different 
countries of the world. Among some of its responsibilities, the OCHA office that operates in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip monitors closures and curfews imposed on the Palestinian population. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
deviation  of  this  variable.  While  not  the i d e a l  m e a s u r e  o f  i n c o m e  i n e q u a l i t y ,  i t  i s  t h e  b e s t  w e  c a n  
compute given the data and it still captures the level of uniformity existent in the society.   
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OCHA provided us with their data on total hours under curfew by district by month between May 
2002  and  December  2006.  Table  3  reports  the  available  data  on  Israeli  security  measures  and 
districts levels of violence.  
Table 3 illustrates the widespread level of violence during the second Intifada. On average, 
every district suffers almost 9 Israeli-induced Palestinian fatalities and 4 days of curfews every 
quarter. An average district originates a suicide terrorist every three quarters, and over 10 Israeli 
casualties every quarter (an average of 1.33 Israeli fatalities in suicide attacks per district-quarter 
cell).  At  the  same  time,  the  table  depicts  the  high  level  of  variation  on  the  level  of  violence. 
Although the median number of Palestinian fatalities is 4, for 27 percent of the observations the 
number of Palestinian fatalities is ten or higher. Similarly, for almost 10 percent of the observations 
the  quarterly  number  of  days  with  curfew  exceeds  21.  The  variation  in  the  level  of  violence 
highlights  the  importance  of  including  these  variables  in  the  empirical  analysis  to  control  for 
potential reverse causality. For example, Israeli responses to particularly violent suicide attacks may 
affect local economic conditions. Without properly controlling for security measures one would 
adduce to economic distress the occurrence of a high quality terror attack, when in actuality high 
quality attacks could be the ones causing economic distress (Benmelech et al., 2010). 
 
3. The Impact of Economic Conditions on the Quality of Suicide Attacks 
There is a growing body of literature on the macroeconomic determinants of terrorism.  The 
majority  of  these  studies  find  that  economic  fluctuations  in  countries  from  which  terrorism 
originates do not seem to affect their level of terrorism (Abadie, 2006; Drakos and Gofas, 2006a;  
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Krueger and Laitin, 2008; Piazza, 2006).
9 This does not imply that economic conditions do not 
affect  terrorism  at  all.  Whereas  most  of  the  literature  focused  on  the  direct  relation  between 
economic conditions and the quantity of terror, Bueno de Mesquita (2005a) proposes an indirect, 
subtler, relationship between economic conditions and terrorism. Bueno de Mesquita (2005a) argues 
that  bad  economic  conditions  dampen  individuals’  opportunities  in  the  labor  force  and,  as  a 
consequence, lower their opportunity cost of participation in terror activities. Therefore, if terror 
organizations select suicide terrorists from a large supply of volunteers, they are able to choose 
better-qualified suicide terrorists under bad economic conditions.  
This  section  assesses  the  empirical  validity  of  Bueno  de  Mesquita’s  (2005)  theoretical 
conclusions. The main necessary condition for Bueno de Mesquita’s (2005a) theory to hold is that 
the supply of suicide terrorists is greater than its demand. This condition holds for Palestinians terror 
organizations, as documented in the field study of Hassan (2001). Hassan (2001) reports that one of 
Hamas’  biggest  problems  during  the  time  period  at  issue  was  selecting  a  few  among  the  large 
quantity of volunteers willing to be sent in suicide missions.
10 Therefore, if bad economic conditions 
lead to an increase in the supply of suicide terrorists (but do not affect the frequency of attacks), then 
terror organizations will be able to choose suicide terrorists with better qualifications. Given that 
better  qualified  terrorists  lead  to  more  desirable  outcomes  for  terror  factions  (Benmelech  and 
                                                 
9 These studies focus on transnational terrorism using data from a cross-section of countries.  We show 
below that fluctuations on the level of unemployment at the district level are not correlated with the 
frequency  of  suicide  attacks  that  the  district  originates.    Hence,  our  results  are  in  line  with  the 
conclusions of these studies.   
10 This suggests that terror organizations are not constrained by a lack of volunteers to carry out attacks. 
To explain fluctuations on suicide attacks we therefore need to focus mostly on terror organizations’ 
strategic considerations and capabilities to overcome security obstacles enacted by Israel. See Berrebi 
(2009) for further discussion of demand versus supply constraints in terrorism.  
 
13 
Berrebi, 2007), it logically follows that, conditional on originating a suicide attack, bad economic 
conditions indirectly lead to terror attacks of higher quality. 
 
A.  Empirical Framework 
To test the relationship between economic conditions and the quality of terrorism we focus 
exclusively on district-quarter cells that originated at least one suicide attack. We assign to every 
suicide terrorist the prevailing economic, demographic and security conditions in his or her district 
in the quarter preceding the attack to further address the possibility of reverse causality. These data 
allow us to test the effect of poor economic conditions on the quality of suicide terrorists, their 
targets, and the outcomes of the attacks.   
Formally, our general specification is:   
(Quality of Suicide Terrorism)i,t = α(Economic Variables)i,t-1 + β(Demographic Variables)i,t-1  
           + γ(Security Measures)i,t-1 + εi,t           (1) 
where the (Quality of Suicide Terrorism) are the proxies, presented in Table 1, associated with the 
characteristics of the suicide terrorists, their targets, the logistics of their attack and the attacks’ 
outcomes of each suicide terrorist i that committed an attack in quarter t. We focus, alternatively, on 
local unemployment rate, group-specific unemployment rate, and income inequality at the district of 
origin of the terrorist in the quarter before the attack as our main explanatory economic variable of 
interest. All the specifications control for demographic characteristics and Israeli security measures 
that  vary  across  districts  and  time.  These  include  average  years  of  education,  percentage  of 
population  living  in  a  refugee  camp,  average  age,  proportion  of  male  in  the  local  population, 
proportion of married population, population size, as well as local Palestinian fatalities and local 
curfews.  In  addition,  we  include  a  West-Bank  dummy  to  control  for  regional  unobservable  
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characteristics that are constant over time.
11  Finally, εi,t is an error term (clustered at the regional 
level) that captures non-systematic determinants of the quality of a suicide attack.  
Our detailed data set allows us to overcome some of the difficulties associated with the task 
of estimating the causal effects of economic conditions on the quality of suicide terrorism. First, we 
control for counter-terror measures enacted by the Israeli government in the aftermath of an attack 
that may also affect economic conditions. Second, the longitudinal dimension of the data provides a 
sequential order of the events of interest, allowing us to look at the effects of past economic and 
demographic conditions on subsequent characteristics of suicide terrorists and their attacks. Finally, 
the time variation in the data allows us to include year fixed effects to control for events that are 
common to all the districts, occurred at a particular point in time, and may simultaneously affect the 
quality of suicide attacks and economic conditions. 
 
B.  Results 
Table  4  presents  the  estimated  impact  of  economic  conditions  on  the  characteristics  of 
suicide terrorists. Panel A of the table focuses on the education of suicide terrorists, Panel B on their 
age, and the last panel on the level of their previous involvement in terror activities. All panels 
present  the  same  specifications:  for  each  panel,  the  left  column  reports  the  estimated  marginal 
effects from a probit model of the respective covariate on the dependent variable at issue. The 
general unemployment rate is the main variable of interest in the first three rows, the group-specific 
unemployment rate is the variable of interest in rows 4 to 6, and income inequality is the focus of 
                                                 
11 I d e a l l y ,  w e  w o u l d  h a v e  l i k e d  t o  i n c l u d e  d i s t r i c t  f i x e d  e f f e c t s  i n s t e a d  o f  r e g i o n a l  f i x e d  e f f e c t s .  
Unfortunately, the available data do not have sufficient variation to allow the inclusion of district fixed 
effects and still estimate the coefficients of interest with a satisfying level of precision.   
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rows 7 to 9;
12 the middle column adds years fixed effects to the previous specification; and the 
specification in the right adds the number of days with curfew to the regression in the middle 
column. Our preferred specification is the one in the middle column because including days with 
curfews to the specification significantly reduces the number of observations.
13  
The  results  of  the  table  support  the  hypothesis  that  bad  economic  conditions  affect  the 
quality of suicide terrorists. Higher unemployment rates (whether general or group-specific) are 
associated with more educated, more mature and more experienced suicide terrorists. In particular, 
based on our preferred specification, a one percentage point increase of the unemployment rate 
significantly  raises  the  probability  that  next  quarter’s  suicide  terrorist  i)  has  some  academic 
education  by  1.38  percentage  points;  ii)  that  the  terrorist  is  older  than  20  years  old  by  0.62 
percentage points; iii) and that the terrorist was previously involved in terror activities by 0.81 
percentage  points.  These  effects  are  of  an  important  magnitude.  They  imply  that  a  standard 
deviation  increase  in  the  level  of  unemployment  causes  an  increase  of  34.3  percent  on  the 
probability that the suicide terrorist has some academic education relative to their mean education 
level. Similarly, for a one standard deviation increase in the level of unemployment, they represent 
an increase of 5.57 percent on the probability that the terrorist is older than 20 years old, and an 
                                                 
12 In addition to the reported economic variable and security measures, the regression controls for each 
district proportion of males, married, average years of schooling, population size and proportion of the 
population living in a refugee camp. 
13 R e c a l l  t h a t  t h e  d a t a  o n  c u r f e w s  a r e  o n l y  a v a i l a b l e  f r o m  M a y  2 0 0 2 .  T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  




increase  of  33.5  percent  on  the  probability  that  the  terrorist  was  previously  involved  in  terror 
activities, relative to their unconditional means.
14  
The  impact  of  the  other  variables  of  interest  on  the  quality  of  suicide  terrorists  is  not 
consistently  significant  across  the  different  measures.  The  analysis  suggests  that  higher  income 
inequality raises the quality of suicide terrorists. Therefore, our results do not support the hypothesis 
that  a  heightened  identification  with  the  grievances  of  the  in-group  (as  measured  by  income 
inequality) leads mature, educated and experienced individuals to commit terror attacks. Security 
measures imposed by Israel do not have a consistent effect in terms of their sign or significance 
level.   
Table 5 repeats the analysis of Table 4 focusing on the characteristics of targeted localities. 
The results confirm that economic conditions have a significant effect on the importance of the 
localities targeted in suicide attacks. Higher unemployment rates and greater inequality significantly 
increase the likelihood that the targeted city has a large population. The estimated coefficients in 
Column (2) imply that a standard deviation increase in unemployment results in a 17.6 percent 
increase on the probability that the targeted city has a large population relative to the mean number 
of large cities. Similarly, a standard deviation increase in inequality causes a 25.7 percent increase 
on the probability of a large city being targeted. The probability that the city acts as a regional 
capital  also  increases  in  recessionary  economies,  though  the  effect  of  either  measure  of 
unemployment  is  not  statistically  significant  for  all  the  specifications.  In  line  with  the  results 
                                                 
14 At this point, it is important to remark that the changes in the magnitudes and significance levels of the 
estimates from the second to the third column of each panel are due to the shorter sample and not to the 
inclusion of curfews as a dependent variable. Basically, when we restrict the sample to May 2002 and 
onwards the results are the same regardless of whether or not the curfews variable is included as a 
covariate in the model.  
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obtained regarding the characteristics of suicide terrorists, the impact of the other covariates is not 
consistently  significant  across  specifications  and  proxies  for  the  importance  of  the  targeted 
localities.  
Table  6  focuses  on  the  logistics  of  terror  attacks.  The  table  shows  that  bad  economic 
conditions lead terror organizations to commit attacks closer to the suicide terrorists’ localities of 
residence and to their headquarters. These results are partially explained by terror organizations 
sending experienced suicide terrorists when unemployment is particularly high, and by experienced 
terrorist choosing closer targets to avoid the risk of being caught by the Israeli security forces.
15 In 
addition, the table indicates that suicide terrorists travel longer distances to commit attacks as the 
number of Palestinian fatalities in their district increases (though the effect is not always statistically 
significant). This effect may be driven by the difficulty of committing an attack against Israeli 
civilians nearby due to increased Israeli military presence. Another possibility is that Palestinian 
fatalities heighten the desire to retaliate against Israeli civilians in Israel’s most important cities. 
Finally,  Table  7  presents  the  effects  of  economic  conditions  on  the  outcome  of  suicide 
attacks. These results are not as conclusive as our previous findings. While the results in some of the 
columns  suggest  that  higher  unemployment  rates  significantly  increase  the  probability  that  the 
suicide terrorist is caught, this is not consistent across the three different specifications, casting 
doubts on the validity of the result. Similarly, neither of the measures for the unemployment rate 
consistently affects the number of casualties.  
If anything, the table suggests that higher income inequality leads to terror attacks of higher 
quality. That is, higher income inequality reduces the chances that the terrorist is caught, and causes 
                                                 
15 Suicide terrorists previously involved in terror activities travel, on average, 17.9 km to commit an 
attack, whereas inexperienced terrorists travel an average of 27.8 km to commit an attack. The difference 
between the two means is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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an increase in the number of casualties. Finally, the table consistently implies that the outcomes of 
terror  attacks  are  significantly  affected  by  Israeli  security  measures.  A  stronger  Israeli  military 
presence (measured by the number of days with curfew and the number of Palestinian fatalities) is 
effective in terms of stopping suicide terrorists.  
Summarizing,  this  section  shows  that  there  is  a  strong  correlation  between  economic 
conditions,  characteristics  of  suicide  terrorists  and  the  targets  they  attack.  High  unemployment 
enables terror organizations to recruit more educated, mature and experienced suicide terrorists, who 
in turn attack more important targets, located closer to their district of residence. We find that the 
outcomes of these attacks are not consistently correlated with economic conditions. Perhaps, the 
reason behind this is that attacks’ outcomes are more random in nature than the other characteristics 
associated  with  suicide  terrorism  that  are  mostly  controlled  by  the  terrorists  or  the  terror 
organizations. Having said that, it is important to remark that there is an indirect relation between 
economic conditions and the outcome of attacks. While we establish that higher unemployment rates 
lead  to  terrorist  of  higher  quality  attacking  more  important  targets,  previous  work  showed  that 
terrorists of higher quality cause more fatalities and are less likely to be caught when assigned to 
important targets (Benmelech and Berrebi, 2007). 
 
4. Economic Conditions and Suicide Attacks across Factions 
This section investigates the effect of economic conditions on the willingness of different 
Palestinian factions to carry suicide attacks. Several theoretical studies analyze why different types 
of factions react differently to the same political environment.
16 The related literature focuses mostly 
on the peace process (Kydd and Walter, 2002; Bueno de Mesquita, 2005b), the timing of elections 
                                                 
16 See, for example, the theoretical analyses of Kydd and Walter (2002, 2006), Bueno de Mesquita 
(2005b), and Berrebi and Klor (2006), and their applications to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
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(Berrebi and Klor, 2006 and 2008), and Israeli policies of counter-terrorism (Jaeger and Paserman, 
2008) as triggers of terrorism. In what follows, we investigate whether economic conditions may 
lead different factions to different strategies regarding the number of suicide attacks they commit.   
Several Palestinian factions were involved in suicide terrorism during the second Intifada. 
The factions were closely associated to one of the three main political Palestinian organizations: 
Fatah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).
17 These groups differ in terms of their level of 
religiosity, ideology, organizational structure, political objectives, and even their strategic responses 
to Israeli-induced Palestinian fatalities (Jaeger and Paserman, 2006).   
In conjunction with ideology, economic conditions play an important role in the level of 
terrorism chosen by terror organizations. As argued by Bueno de Mesquita (2008), the factions’ 
level  of  radicalization,  although  chosen  to  maximize  political  support,  is  affected  by  economic 
conditions. We expect a similar effect to play a role on the organizations at issue. For example, the 
theory of economic voting implies that the level of unemployment should affect the support for 
Fatah, the political organization at the helm of the Palestinian National Authority during most of the 
analyzed period.  
Though in a different direction, economic conditions should also affect support for Hamas, 
an organization that provides excludable local public goods like education, welfare and medical care 
(Mishal  and  Sela,  2000).  Naturally,  the  value  of  the  goods  provided  by  Hamas  increases  on 
recessionary  economies.  This  should  increase  the  demand  for  membership  in  Hamas,  and  the 
sacrifice that individuals are willing to make so that they, and their families, are accepted as group 
members (Berman, 2000). Therefore, a combination of the club model with Bueno de Mesquita’s 
                                                 
17 I n  o u r  data  set,  49  terrorists  belonged  to  factions  affiliated  with  Fatah,  61  belonged  to  factions 
affiliated with Hamas, and 46 belonged to the PIJ.  
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(2005a) theory of the quality of terrorism implies not only that religious clubs are more likely to 
commit suicide attacks (Berman and Laitin, 2008), but that religious clubs can conduct more attacks 
when economic conditions are bad. 
We  analyze  the  heterogeneous  effect  of  economic  conditions  on  suicide  attacks  across 
factions and report the results in Table 8. The first column of Table 8 presents the results of Probit 
regressions  where  the  dependent  variable  is  an  indicator  for  Islamic  suicide  terrorists  (those 
affiliated with Hamas and the PIJ), with the same set of covariates used in the models in Tables 4 to 
7. The results show that unemployment has a positive and highly significant effect on the likelihood 
of Islamic organizations committing a suicide attack, equal to a 8.16 percent increase (relative to its 
mean) on the probability that the suicide terrorist belongs to an Islamic organization for a standard 
deviation increase in the level of unemployment of the whole population. Income inequality and 
Israeli-induced  Palestinian  fatalities  have  a  negative  effect  on  suicide  attacks  by  Islamic 
organizations.   
The results in the first column of Table 8 seem to imply that religiosity plays an important 
role on the organizations’ differing response to economic conditions. Aggregating suicide terrorists 
affiliated with Hamas and the PIJ, however, masks important differences across these two religious 
groups. Most notably, while Hamas provided excludable social services during the time period at 
issue, the PIJ did not provide social services at all. To address this issue, the remaining columns of 
the table present the results from estimating a multinomial logit model for faction committing a 
suicide attack. The dependent variable takes on one of three values: Fatah, Hamas and PIJ. To 
facilitate comparison with previous tables we present the marginal effects of the relevant economic 
variable for each faction, rather than the multinomial logit coefficients. The results confirm our 
hypothesis  regarding  the  effect  of  economic  conditions  on  religious  factions  that  provide  local 
public goods. We find that Hamas shows the highest sensitivity to the unemployment rate, with an  
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increase of over 4 percentage points on the number of suicide terrorists dispatched to Israel for every 
one percent increase in unemployment. The marginal effect of unemployment for Fatah is negative 
and statistically significant, though of lesser magnitude than the decrease observed by the PIJ.  
The estimated coefficients in Table 8 provide an intuitive ordering of the different groups 
based on the type of public goods that they provide (if at all). This ordering suggests that groups that 
provide excludable public goods (i.e. Hamas) are able to increase their ability to commit terror 
attacks during difficult economic times. The magnitude of the effect of economic conditions on the 
number  of  attacks  of  groups  that  provide  non-excludable  public  goods  (i.e.  Fatah)  is  not  as 
important, whereas the ability to commit suicide attacks of groups that are not associated with the 
provision  of  any  public  goods  (i.e.  PIJ)  significantly  decrease  when  unemployment  increases. 
Interestingly, only for the PIJ (a religious group that does not provide any type of public good) 
altruistic motives appear to drive suicide terrorists. In particular, a more homogenous society (as 
measured by a decrease in income inequality) is associated with an increase of suicide terrorists 
affiliated with this organization.  
 
5. The Impact of Economic Conditions on the Frequency of Suicide Attacks 
In this section we examine the correlation between economic conditions and the frequency of 
suicide  attacks  during  the  second  Palestinian  uprising.  We  adopt  a  similar  approach  to  related 
studies on the macroeconomic determinants of transnational terrorism but focusing on one particular 
case study.
18  
                                                 
18 See Sandler and Enders (2008) for a comprehensive discussion of the related literature. Note also the 
recent contribution of Berman et al. (2009), who find a negative correlation between unemployment and 
attacks by insurgents in Iraq.  
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We believe it is important to compare our analysis to the related literature because of several 
important differences. By focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we alleviate concerns driven 
by unobserved political, cultural and institutional cross-country differences. Using our longitudinal 
data set we are able to control for unobserved characteristics of each district that are constant over 
time and may affect the district’s level of terrorism. Moreover, by assembling a detailed data set that 
includes  information  not  only  on  economic  and  demographic  variables,  but  also  on  counter-
terrorism policies, we can control for socio-economic characteristics as well as counter-terrorism 
measures. Finally, our data set contains information on all suicide terrorists during the time period at 
issue.  Therefore,  it  does  not  suffer  from  any  type  of  reporting  bias  or  under-reporting  that  is 
suspected to affect data on transnational terrorism (Drakos and Gofas, 2006b).   
Our general specification to analyze the relationship between economic and demographic 
conditions and the occurrence of suicide attacks focuses on three different proxies of terrorism: i) 
the  number  of  suicide  attacks  that  originated  from  each  quarter-district  cell;  ii)  the  number  of 
casualties caused in suicide attacks that originated in each cell; and iii) an indicator that equals one if 
at  least  one  suicide  attack  originated  in  district  i  at  quarter  t,  and  zero  otherwise.  The  main 
specifications  control  for  the  same  economic,  demographic,  and  security  variables  specified  in 
model (1).  
Table  9  displays  the  results  from  estimating  the  effects  of  economic  conditions  on  the 
number of suicide terror attacks using a Poisson regression model because the dependent variable is 
a  countable  variable  that  admits  only  non-negative  integers  and  is  best  described  as  a  Poisson 
distribution. Each cell in the table presents the estimated coefficient of a separate regression between 
the variable of interest and the number of suicide attacks. The left panel of the table alternatively 
examines the correlations between the number of suicide attacks and the contemporaneous general 
unemployment rate, group-specific unemployment rate or income inequality, whereas the right panel  
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of  the  table  examines  the  correlation  between  the  number  of  suicide  attacks  with  the  reigning 
economic and demographic conditions in the preceding quarter.  
The  first  column  in  the  table  presents  coefficients  estimated  using  simple  univariate 
regression models, each of which explains the correlation between the number of suicide attacks and 
a different explanatory variable contemporary to the occurrence of attacks. The results suggest that 
current economic conditions are significantly correlated with the timing and district of origin of 
suicide attacks. Accordingly, unemployment is positively correlated with suicide attacks and income 
inequality is negatively correlated with attacks. These results are not as precisely estimated after we 
add  to  each  specification  the  demographic  control  variables  detailed  above  (column  2).  The 
significant correlations completely disappear, however, once we include in the analysis year fixed 
effects (column 3). This implies that the statistically significant correlations observed in columns 1 
and 2 are mainly driven by the similar fluctuations of these variables over time. The second panel of 
the  table  shows  the  correlations  between  the  number  of  suicide  attacks  and  the  same  control 
variables, with all the controls lagged one quarter. The results in this panel lead us to the same 
conclusions. Namely, economic conditions do not appear to cause suicide attacks. 
Table  10  performs  a  similar  analysis  using  as  the  dependent  variables  the  number  of 
casualties from suicide attacks that originated in each quarter-district cell and an indicator for the 
occurrence of a suicide attack that originated in each cell. These analyses rely on a Poisson and 
linear probability regression model, respectively.
19 The results in Table 10 show a similar pattern to 
those in the previous table. Accordingly, some columns suggest a link between suicide terrorism and 
                                                 
19 To avoid unnecessary clutter, this table focuses exclusively on the correlations between the dependent 
variables  of  interest  and  preceding  economic  conditions.  The  correlations  between  the  dependent 
variables and current economic conditions are qualitatively similar to those observed in Table 9.   
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economic conditions. This link completely disappears, or even changes sign, once year fixed effects 
are included in the analysis. 
Summarizing,  the  findings  of  this  section  unambiguously  establish  that  there  is  not  a 
consistent  statistically  significant  impact  of  economic  conditions  on  the  frequency  of  suicide 
terrorism. In addition, the analysis demonstrates that inappropriate specifications (resulting mainly 
from limited data sets) may deliver spurious correlations.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This  paper  provided  a  systematic  analysis  of  the  link  between  economic  conditions,  the 
quality of suicide terrorists, the characteristics of their targets, and the outcomes of their attacks. We 
uncovered  a  strong  correlation  between  economic  conditions  and  the  characteristics  of  suicide 
terrorists and targets they attack. In particular, we document that high unemployment and poor 
economic conditions enable terror organizations to recruit more educated, mature and experienced 
suicide  terrorists,  who  in  turn  attack  more  important  targets,  located  closer  to  their  district  of 
residence. Furthermore, we show that bad economic conditions do not drive the quality of terror 
equally for different organizations, but rather affect groups that provide excludable public goods by 
increasing their ability to commit terror attacks during difficult economic times. 
Our paper focuses on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for a variety of reasons. Notably, by 
focusing on a particular case study, we are able to build an exceptionally rich longitudinal data set 
that allows us to identify the causal connection between economic conditions and the quality of 
terrorism. We control for Israeli counterterrorism measures, regional fix effects, and observed the 
effect  of  past  economic,  demographic  and  security  conditions  on  the  current  quality  of  suicide 
terrorism. All these features are crucial to overcome concerns about reverse causality, whereby 
successful  terror  attacks  prompt  Israeli  retaliation  and  the  ensuing  worsening  of  economic  
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conditions.  The  particularities  of  this  conflict  notwithstanding,  we  believe  that  the  connection 
between economic conditions and the quality of suicide terrorism applies more generally.
20 Hence, 
the policy implications mentioned in the introduction should be taken into consideration in other 
conflicts as well.  
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Figure 1: Districts of Origin of Suicide Terrorists 
 
Notes: Numbers indicate the numbers of suicide terrorists originating from each district between the 
years 2000 and 2006. Number of 
Observations Mean
Standard 
Deviation Median Minimum Maximum
Suicide Terrorist has Academic Education 157 0.197 0.399 0 0 1
Age of Suicide Terrorist 156 21.397 5.727 21 12 64
Suicide Terrorist Previously Involved in Terror 
Activity 
157 0.121 0.327 0 0 1
Targeted Locality's Population above 50,000 157 0.745 0.437 1 0 1
Regional Capital 157 0.535 0.500 1 0 1
Distance Suicide Terrorist's Locality to Target (km) 156 26.607 22.768 23.230 0 142.4
Distance Terror Head Quarters to Target (km) 133 25.903 23.633 19.782 0 142.4
Caught Suicide Terrorist 157 0.248 0.433 0 0 1
Casualties from Suicide Attack 157 29.535 39.397 10 0 181
Notes: The summary statistics reflect authors' calculations based on Israeli Security Agency reports of suicide terrorists. The targeted cities population refers to their population 
within the metro area of the city according to the population figures for the year 2003 of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics.  
Table 1
Summary Statistics on the Characteristics of Suicide Terrorists and their Attacks
A. Characteristics of Suicide Terrorists
B. Characteristics of Targeted Locality
C. Logistics of Suicide Attack
D. Outcome of Suicide AttackMean
Standard 
Deviation Median Minimum Maximum
Unemployment Rate 0.591 0.049 0.589 0.419 0.728
Group Specific Unemployment Rate 0.370 0.078 0.368 0.157 0.654
Income Inequality 1.099 0.208 1.080 0.596 1.679
Percentage Employed in Israel 0.051 0.043 0.044 0 0.207
Years of Schooling 9.203 0.513 9.234 7.431 10.346
Refugee Camp 0.170 0.178 0.112 0 0.696
West Bank 0.688 0.464 1 0 1
Age 33.633 0.968 33.660 31.133 35.804
Male 0.502 0.013 0.502 0.460 0.539
Married 0.572 0.031 0.573 0.496 0.659
Population Size (over 15 years old, hundreds) 1388 606 1446 200 3081
Table 2
 Economic and Demographic Characteristics of Districts (Quarterly Averages)
Notes: Entries in the table represent districts-quarters statistics of the respective variable. The number of observations equals 448 for all variables.
Data source: Palestinian Labor Force Survey of the West Bank and Gaza Strip between the years 2000 to 2006.Mean
Standard 
Deviation Median Minimum Maximum
Palestinian Fatalities  8.732 14.210 4 0 121
Days with Curfew 3.889 12.413 0 0 89
Suicide Terrorists 0.348 0.914 0 0 8
Israeli Casualties from Suicide Terror Attacks 10.248 37.214 0 0 362
Table 3
 Israeli Security Measures and Districts' Level of Violence
Notes: Entries in the table represent districts-quarters statistics of the respective variable. There are 304 observations for days with curfew and 448
observations for all the other variables. The data on the number of Palestinian fatalities was obtained from B'tselem. The data cover the years 2000 to
2006. The data on days with curfew was obtained from the U.N. office for the coordination of humanitarian affairs. The information for this variables is
available only from May 2002 to December 2006. The data on the number of suicide terrorists and Israeli casualties from suicide terror attacks was
obtained from reports of the Israeli Security Agency. These data cover the years 2000 to 2006.Unemployment Rate 1.056 1.372 *** 0.613 *** 0.660 *** 0.616 ** 0.316 1.530 *** 0.806 ** 0.496 ***
Palestinian Fatalities -0.002 *** -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 *** -0.003 -0.004 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0005
Days with Curfews 0.002 0.004 * -0.0003
1.419 *** 1.760 *** 1.593 *** 0.239 0.632 *** 0.169 0.217 0.452 *** -0.085
Palestinian Fatalities -0.002 * -0.003 * -0.002 -0.003 *** -0.003 -0.002 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007
Days with Curfews 0.000 0.002 *** -0.000
Income Inequality -0.174 *** -0.159 0.262 0.756 *** 0.474 *** 0.706 ** 0.502 *** 0.566 ** 0.219 ***
Palestinian Fatalities -0.002 *** -0.003 -0.004 * -0.002 ** -0.002 -0.003 * 0.001 0.001 *** 0.001




Notes: Each column reports the estimated marginal effects of a separate Probit regression model in which the dependent variable is an indicator of the education of suicide terrorists, an indicator of their age, and an indicator of their experience. In
addition to the explanatory variables listed on the left, regressions in Columns 1, 4, and 7 add each district average years of education, population size over the age of 15, proportion of males, married, proportion living in a refugee camp and whether
the district is in the West Bank as explanatory variables. We subsequently add to these regressions years fixed effects (regressions in Columns 2, 5 and 8) and days with curfews (regressions in Columns 3, 6 and 9). Robust standard errors (adjusted




The Effect of Economic Conditions on the Characteristics of Suicide Terrorists
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.005] [0.001] [0.003]
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
[0.002]
A. Education of Suicide Terrorist
[0.827] [0.146] [0.047]





(4) (5) (6) (8) (9)
[0.062]
C. Suicide Terrorist Previously Involved in Terror
(7)
[0.352] [0.125] [0.157]
156 141 64 143 143 74 156 143 79
Dependent Variable








Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
[0.003] [0.000] [0.001]
[0.046] [0.375] [0.293] [0.038] [0.014] [0.346] [0.182] [0.251] [0.043]
[0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.003] [0.002]
Group Specific 
Unemployment Rate
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001]Unemployment Rate 1.116 2.259 *** 2.728 1.914 0.010 1.316 ***
Palestinian Fatalities -0.003 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.002
Days with Curfews -0.001 0.005 **
0.470 0.773 *** 0.092 0.463 -0.022 3.716 *
Palestinian Fatalities -0.003 *** -0.002 *** -0.003 *** 0.001 0.001 0.001
Days with Curfews 0.0004 0.005 **
Income Inequality 0.789 *** 0.829 *** 1.866 *** 1.494 *** 1.529 *** 2.387 ***
Palestinian Fatalities -0.001 *** 0.000 0.001 * 0.004 *** 0.005 *** 0.005






Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
[0.000] [0.004]
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.005]
[0.276] [0.230] [0.504] [0.177] [0.360] [0.345]
[0.000] [0.001]
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003]
156 143 66 156










Regional Capital Targeted City Population
[0.000] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
[0.811] [2.109]
[1.076] [0.279]
The Effect of Economic Conditions on the Characteristics of Targeted Cities
Table 5
Notes: Each column reports the estimated marginal effects of a separate Probit regression model in which the dependent variable is an indicator of the targeted city population
(equals one for cities with over 50,000 inhabitants) and whether the city is a regional capital. In addition to the explanatory variables listed on the left, regressions in Columns 1
and 4 add each district years of education, population size over the age of 15, proportion of males, married, proportion living in a refugee camp and whether the district is in the
West Bank as explanatory variables. We subsequently add to these regressions years fixed effects (regressions in Columns 2 and 5) and days with curfews (regressions in
Columns 3 and 6). Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering at the regional level) are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistically significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent





(3)Unemployment Rate -162.189 *** -158.336 *** -172.355 *** -115.356 *** -128.742 *** -180.165 ***
Palestinian Fatalities 0.153 0.147 -0.046 0.201 *** 0.185 *** -0.009
Days with Curfews 0.326 0.309 ***
-78.240 *** -75.472 *** -129.245 ** -34.636 *** -42.001 *** -93.647 ***
Palestinian Fatalities 0.127 0.128 -0.128 0.185 *** 0.174 *** -0.058
Days with Curfews 0.424 0.359 ***
Income Inequality -21.124 -25.180 *** -2.664 -26.879 *** -30.238 *** -4.525 ***
Palestinian Fatalities 0.074 0.059 -0.038 0.118 *** 0.098 *** 0.038






Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
[0.309] [0.027]
[0.065] [0.183] [0.416] [0.014] [0.031] [0.060]





Yes Yes Yes Yes
[11.104] [11.400] [60.644] [5.137]
(3) (2)







Notes: Each column reports the estimated effects of a separate OLS regression model in which the dependent variable is the distance between the suicide terrorists' locality of
residence and the targeted city, and the distance between the terror head quarters and the targeted city. In addition to the explanatory variables listed on the left, regressions in
Columns 1 and 4 add each district average years of education, population size over the age of 15, proportion of males, married, proportion living in a refugee camp and whether
the district is in the West Bank as explanatory variables. We subsequently add to these regressions years fixed effects (regressions in Columns 2 and 5) and days with curfews
(regressions in Columns 3 and 6). Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering at the regional level) are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistically significance at the 10, 5









The Effect of Economic Conditions on the Logistics of Suicide Attacks
(1)
[0.053] [0.037]Unemployment Rate -0.710 *** 0.606 ** 1.516 *** 2.551 *** 0.259 -8.716 ***
Palestinian Fatalities 0.006 *** 0.005 *** 0.010 *** -0.007 *** -0.003 *** -0.006 **
Days with Curfews -0.002 * 0.004
-0.385 -0.156 * 0.421 1.766 *** 0.747 * -2.211 **
Palestinian Fatalities 0.006 *** 0.005 *** 0.010 *** -0.007 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 **
Days with Curfews -0.002 *** 0.002
Income Inequality -0.516 *** -0.620 *** -1.206 *** 0.638 *** 0.579 ** 0.942 ***
Palestinian Fatalities 0.005 *** 0.004 *** 0.007 *** -0.005 * -0.001 0.004










[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003]
[0.059] [0.195] [0.121] [0.154] [0.296] [0.032]









Casualties from Suicide Attack
(3) (2)
[0.296] [0.183]
Notes: Each column reports the estimated effects of a separate regression in which the dependent variable is whether the suicide terrorist was caught (estimated using a Probit
model), and the number of casualties from suicide attacks (estimated using a Poisson model). In addition to the explanatory variables listed on the left, regressions in Columns 1
and 4 add each district average years of education, population size over the age of 15, proportion of males, married, proportion living in a refugee camp and whether the district is
in the West Bank as explanatory variables. We subsequently add to these regressions years fixed effects (regressions in Columns 2 and 5) and days with curfews (regressions in
Columns 3 and 6). Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering at the regional level) are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistically significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent
level respectively.              
[0.004]










[0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
[0.001]
[0.002]Unemployment Rate 1.103 *** -1.085 *** 4.019 ** -2.934 *
0.874 *** -0.897 *** 2.352 *** -1.456
Income Inequality -0.474 *** 0.517 *** 0.743 *** -1.261 ***
Year Fixed Effects
Observations
In addition to the explanatory variable listed on the left column, both estimations control for each district average years of education,
population size over the age of 15, proportion of males, married, proportion living in a refugee camp, whether the district is in the
West Bank and years fixed effects. Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering at the regional level) are in parentheses. *, **, ***








The Effect of Economic Conditions on the Organizational Affiliation of Suicide Bombers








Notes: Each cell reports the estimated coefficients of a separate regression. The first column reports the estimated marginal effects
of Probit regressions model in which the dependent variable equals one for suicide terrorists affiliated with Islamic groups (Hamas
and PIJ) and zero othewise. Columns 2 to 4 report the estimated marginal effects of multinomial Logit regressions in which the







[0.105] [0.189] [1.774] Unemployment Rate 13.222 *** 7.230 *** 2.808 6.691 *** 2.104 -1.843
4.727 *** 2.549 1.118 -0.610 -2.689 -3.033
Income Inequality -3.622 *** -1.646 * 0.037 -2.024 *** -0.169 1.243
Observations 448 392 392 432 378 378
Regressions in Columns 2 and 5 add each district average years of education, population size over the age of 15, proportion of males, married, population working in Israel,
proportion living in a refugee camp, number of Palestinian fatalities, whether the district is in the West Bank and district fixed effects as explanatory variables. 
Notes: Each cell reports the estimated coefficients of a separate Poisson panel regression model in which the dependent variable is the number of suicide attacks in each district
for every quarter. The regressions in Columns 1 and 4 have as their only explanatory variable the variable listed in the left.
Regressions in Columns 3 and 6 add year fixed effects to the regressions in Columns 2 and 5. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistically significance at the
10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
[0.595] [0.884] [1.083]
[1.495] [1.814] [1.909] [1.596] [1.933] [2.126]
[2.393] [2.930] [3.076] [2.589] [3.032] [3.351]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table 9
The Effect of Economic Conditions on the Number of Suicide Attacks
Correlation of Number of Suicide Attacks with Current 
Conditions














[0.607] [0.891] [1.057] Unemployment Rate 1.521 *** 1.276 * 0.517 5.515 *** -3.817 *** -3.817 ***
0.436 * 0.294 -0.069 -0.842 *** -4.370 *** -4.370 ***
Income Inequality -0.377 *** -0.226 -0.140 -2.294 *** 0.088 0.088
Observations 432 378 378 432 378 378
The regressions in Columns 1 and 4 have as their only explanatory variable the variable listed in the left. Regressions in Columns 2 and 5 add each district average years of
education, population size over the age of 15, proportion of males, married, population working in Israel, proportion living in a refugee camp, number of Palestinian fatalities,
whether the district is in the West Bank and district fixed effects as explanatory variables. 
Regressions in Columns 3 and 6 add year fixed effects to the regressions in Columns 2 and 5. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistically significance at the




Correlation of Number of Casualties from Suicide Attacks 





The Effect of Economic Conditions on the Occurrence and Number of Casualties from Suicide Attacks

























Notes: Each cell reports the estimated coefficients of a separate panel regression model in which the dependent variable is the ocurrence of suicide attacks (panel A, estimated
using a linear probability model) and number of casualties from suicide attacks (panel B, estimated using a Poisson model) in each district for every quarter. 
[0.196] [0.171]
[0.665] [0.670]